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Abstract
There are more than 3000 ongoing conflicts involving the extractive industries (mining, gas, and 
oil) and communities impacted by extractive activity. Most of these conflicts are in the developing 
countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In this paper we examine three resistance movements 
in Brazil, Chile, and India where Indigenous groups are resisting mining operations on their lands. 
We argue these movements represent forms of translocal subaltern resistance based on local 
political ecologies of marginalized. In particular, we develop the notion of disembeddedness to 
show how conflicts arise between local political ecologies and the political economy of resource 
extraction. We contribute to the literature by (1) bridging insights from subaltern studies and 
political ecology to explain how forms of resistance emerge (2) providing empirical support to 
theories of translocal resistance by conducting a comparative analysis of resistance movements 
from three countries. We discuss the theoretical implications of our findings for resistance 
movements.
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“If there are necessary sacrifices to be made for human progress is it not essential to hold to the principle 
that those to be sacrificed must make the decision themselves?”
Howard Zinn
There are currently more than 3000 ongoing conflicts between communities and the extractive 
industries (mining, oil and gas) where local communities have organized resistance movements 
against powerful market and state actors (EJOLT, 2020). While these conflicts are generally 
described as conflicts over land and resource rights there are deeper underlying tensions about 
ecological, political, social, cultural, and economic impacts of mining projects on communities in 
these regions. Past studies on resource extraction conflicts have focused on the role of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) (Hilson et al., 2019; Kapelus, 2002), stakeholder engagement 
(Yakovleva and Vazquez-Brust, 2012), tensions between ethnic groups (Hilson and Laing, 2017), 
Indigenous rights (Ali and Behrendt, 2001; Banerjee, 2000), and community engagement practices 
(Idemudia, 2009; Muthuri et al., 2008). What is missing from accounts of conflicts is an under-
standing of the competing, often incommensurable cultural and ecological worldviews between 
communities resisting extractive projects and the market-state actors that promote resource extrac-
tion. We argue that it is important to understand the cultural basis of resistance movements and its 
implications for how conflicts are managed because failure to do so can exacerbate existing eco-
nomic, ecological, and social inequalities and lead to more conflict.
In this paper we focus on three resistance movements against mining corporations in Brazil, 
Chile, and India. What we find particularly intriguing is that in all three cases conflicts have arisen 
despite assurances by governments that the proposed projects would deliver economic develop-
ment and by corporations who claimed that their CSR, community engagement and sustainability 
policies would enhance community welfare. Our study is motivated by the following questions: 
What are the sources of conflicts from which resistance movements emerge? What are the com-
monalities and differences between the sources of conflict across the three resistance movements? 
Why and how do resistance movements produce differing outcomes—stopping or failing to stop 
the mining project? Drawing on insights from subaltern resistance and political ecology we pro-
vide cultural and ecological perspectives of resistance that enhances our understanding of resist-
ance movements by providing a more grounded, bottom up account of resistance.
Our paper makes two key contributions. First, we contribute to emerging research about anti-
mining resistance movements in developing countries, a topic that is beginning to get some atten-
tion in organization and management studies. Studies on social movements are predominantly 
focused on Western sites and our paper expands both the geographical scope as well as the socio-
economic and cultural context of narratives of resistance. By providing a “power from below” 
perspective from subaltern groups who have limited means to voice their concerns and who tend to 
be excluded from political representation, our findings lend empirical support to theories of trans-
local resistance by showing how local struggles emerge from contestations with global regimes of 
development (Banerjee, 2011; Misoczky et al., 2017).
Second, our study contributes to the theoretical literature on resistance movements by develop-
ing a framework that explains resistance using theoretical insights from political ecology, a field of 
study that has not received much attention in organization studies. By bridging insights from sub-
altern studies and political ecology we explain how forms of translocal resistance emerge from 
subaltern struggles based on political ecologies that reveal fundamental incommensurabilities with 
market-state political economies of development. In particular, we develop the notion of disembed-
dedness to show how meanings of economy, ecology, and culture that reflect local political 
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ecologies are in conflict with the imperatives of the political economy of resource extraction and 
how interconnections between economy, culture and ecology can influence the strength of resist-
ance movements.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss the broader political economy of resource 
extraction and explain how the market-state nexus establishes the rationale for the developmental 
state. Second, we provide a broad theoretical spectrum using insights from the literature on translo-
cal subaltern resistance to frame the three cases (Banerjee, 2011; Chandra, 2015). Third, we 
describe the political ecology of resistance movements, in particular its economic, ecological, and 
cultural dimensions. We then provide a brief overview of our cases, describe our methods, data 
collection, and analysis. We discuss the main themes that emerge from our findings and theorize 
narratives of resistance using insights from subaltern resistance, political ecology, and accounts of 
local livelihood struggles. We conclude by discussing the implications of our study for future 
research.
The political economy of resource extraction
Government economic policies in the extractive sectors of Brazil, Chile, and India can be 
described as a form of neoliberal developmentalism where the state plays a key role in encourag-
ing foreign investment by opening up markets while also creating institutional arrangements that 
determine how economic and social relations are governed (Adduci, 2012; Nem Singh, 2012; 
Pandey, 2017). The political economy of resource extraction is constituted by the capital-state-
development nexus which reflects both the neoliberal political rationality of governments and 
the governmentality of the developmental state. Neoliberal reforms aimed at expanding private 
investment in the sector are justified in the name of regional and local development, since most 
mining occurs outside of urban centers. Neoliberal developmentalism is governed through prac-
tices of governmentality that regulate the conduct of populations (Foucault, 1979). 
Governmentality refers to practices of government that govern populations not just through the 
institutional power of states but by inscribing a particular political and economic rationality that 
shapes the conduct of individual subjects (Dean, 2010). In the political economy of resource 
extraction governmentality implies managing populations based on the requirements of develop-
ment—thus communities resisting mining operations on their lands need to be “guided” to 
embrace development and these governed populations are organized for productive purposes 
defined by market rationalities. This “guidance” can be consensual in the form of deliberative 
consultative processes with communities but can also involve “legitimate” state violence that is 
deployed to quell dissent and relocate populations (Lemke, 2002).
Thus, capital-state-development nexus forms the structural basis of neoliberal governmentality 
where power is exercised in the economy through the axes of sovereignty, discipline, and govern-
ment. The state exercises authority over its subjects through territorial sovereignty—Brazil, Chile, 
and India for example, have all opened up vast tracts of forest land for mining in recent years—
while expanding the institutional governing structures for mining development through land acqui-
sition policies for private corporations, taxation regimes, royalty payments, environmental 
regulation, health, and social welfare policies that regulate the lives of its subjects through discipli-
nary power (Foucault, 1979). Any community demands for self-determination, autonomy or 
attempts to assert Indigenous sovereignty over lands are countered with state sovereignty and 
either met with state coercive power citing “national interest” or through the disciplinary apparatus 
of social welfare policies. For governmentality to serve effectively in the development state, popu-
lations need to be governed in a way that requires individuals to accept being entrepreneurs of 
themselves through individual choice and responsibility.
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However, within governable populations there are always groups of people that resist governing 
rationalities through, “voluntary insubordination” or “reflected intractability” (Foucault, 2007: 
47). Resistance thus requires “oppositional reflected practices” that can produce “unwieldy knowl-
edge in order to “de-realize” the state from the limits of governmental reason” (Biebricher and 
Vogelmann, 2012: 12). In generating such power/knowledge Foucault (2007: 65) rejects analysis 
of institutional or functional power but calls for “deinstitutionalizing and defunctionalizing” con-
temporary power relations, which implies looking at extra-institutional technologies of power and 
analyzing power relations not in terms of how particular power relations function but where they 
are located, how they were produced in the first place and how they are challenged. Such an analy-
sis requires relying on a knowledge that articulates the disempowering consequences of a particu-
lar power/knowledge while identifying alternate economic, political and social arrangements. 
Understanding local livelihood struggles of Indigenous communities against extractive industries 
may provide some sources of this knowledge as we discuss in the next section.
Translocal subaltern resistance
Resistance to mining projects arises due to negative economic, social, cultural, and ecological 
impacts on Indigenous communities and the disproportionate costs they bear from resource-inten-
sive and resource-extractive industries (United Nations, 2009). Despite billions of dollars of reve-
nue generated from extractive activity between 35 and 55% of the communities that inhabit the 
mining zones of India, Latin America, and Africa live below the poverty line (PWC, 2013). Mining 
conflicts often involve violence, with more than 900 documented killings reported between 2002 
and 2013, mainly in Latin America (Global Witness, 2014). The extractive industries thus provide 
an ideal context to examine resistance movements in diverse regions of the world in order to under-
stand how the political economy of resource extraction impacts local communities and the ways in 
which local communities articulate their resistance.
While there are significant differences in the national contexts of Brazil, Chile, and India in 
terms of their political, regulatory, cultural, and social environments, the local resistance move-
ments can be theorized as translocal (rather than transnational) because they mark a shift from 
nation state based formations of identity and its relationships with territory and political authority 
(Appadurai, 1996). Translocality refers to the multiplicity of local spaces and actors and their inter-
relationships in a global world. The prefix “trans” refers to the ability of translocal interactions to 
“both transcend territorial locality and change the local spaces from which they emerge” (Banerjee, 
2011: 331). The diversity of Indigenous tribes living in different nation states yet sharing a com-
mon relationship with the land and cultural identities that transcends national borders reflects a 
form of translocality.
The three resistance movements in Brazil, Chile, and India that we analyze in this study can be 
theorized as forms of subaltern resistance, where marginalized groups with limited or no access to 
political participation organize resistance against extractive projects, which they perceive can 
threaten their livelihoods, culture and social welfare (Pal, 2016). Scholarly studies of subaltern 
resistance date back to the 1970s and 1980s with the Subaltern Studies Collective perhaps being 
the most prominent group that pioneered the study of peasant resistance against colonial rule in 
India (Guha, 1983). These and other studies of peasant resistance in southeast Asia (Scott, 1976), 
Latin America (Mallon, 1994) and South Africa (Comaroff, 1985) described how marginalized 
groups on the fringes of society resisted the political authority of the state while remaining on the 
“outside” of modern market-state economies (Chandra, 2015).
Mumby (2005: 23) describes resistance as “an effort to engage in some form of praxis—indi-
vidual or collective, routine or organized—in the context of established social patterns and 
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structures (including mechanisms of control), such that these patterns and structures are, at some 
level, dereified and their identity logic interrogated”. If we adopt this view of resistance, the con-
flicts we describe in this paper reflect narratives of “resistance from below” where subaltern popu-
lations attempt to renegotiate power relations to protect their livelihoods. For Indigenous 
communities facing the brunt of extractives industries their relationship with the land becomes the 
basis for resistance where they use a variety of tactics to negotiate with market, state and civil 
society actors to resist threats to their economy, culture, and ecology. Resistance may or may not 
ameliorate oppressive conditions or lead to radical social change but as Chandra (2015: 561) points 
out it is important to differentiate the “failure of resistance” from the “failure to resist.” And as we 
will see, the outcomes of the three resistance movements did not overcome oppressive structures 
in all cases and in the case of Brazil, reinforced the power of market and state actors.
The theoretical framework of subaltern resistance has three major elements: rightful resistance 
(O’Brien and Li, 2006), lawfare (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2006), and political society (Chatterjee, 
2004). Rightful resistance operates within existing societal structures of power and domination 
where resisting groups and individuals negotiate with state, market and civil society actors using 
the latter’s rhetoric and language. For example, communities that are impacted by extractive indus-
tries engage with sustainability discourses deployed by market and state actors in an attempt to 
push local sustainability demands (Banerjee, 2011).
Lawfare refers to the use of judicial systems by local communities to oppose development projects 
that threaten their livelihoods (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2006). In recent years several Indigenous 
groups have either won lawsuits to stop extractive projects or received compensation from mining 
corporations for environmental damage. For instance, the Achuar tribe in the Peruvian Amazon won 
an out-of-court settlement after a long legal battle with Occidental Petroleum after they sued the com-
pany for causing pollution that led to deaths and birth defects in their communities (Collyns, 2015). 
Legal action by communities in the Chilean and Indian resistance movements described in this paper 
was also successful in stopping extractive projects, despite prior state approval of the projects.
Finally, subaltern resistance represents a form of political society (Chatterjee, 2004) whose 
members often face the brunt of state and market power while resisting extractive projects. These 
groups tend be excluded from civil society, which mainly consists of elites that enjoy a greater 
range of citizenship rights. Despite their marginal status resistance among members of a political 
society engage in “uncivil or unruly forms of politics” that serve their interests (Chandra, 2015: 
562). Resistance tactics are sometimes “unlawful” and involve confrontations with state forces and 
direct action against corporations especially when community demands cannot be accommodated 
within existing laws or administrative systems (Chatterjee, 2011).
The communities in our study represent subaltern groups within their respective nation states in 
terms of their social, economic, political and even geographical disadvantages. We focus on their 
narratives of resistance in particular the cultural and ecological dimensions of their struggles, which 
enable us to provide a more grounded approach to resistance. Conflicts between Indigenous com-
munities and the extractive industries are essentially over contested meanings of development aris-
ing from political, social, cultural, and economic differences between different groups of people and 
their uneven access to resources (Escobar, 2006). We discuss these local political ecologies in the 
next section.
The political ecology of resistance
Political ecology reflects relationships between economic, social, and political conditions that cre-
ate and manage environmental problems, combining ecological concerns with natural resource 
exploitation (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987)[AQ: 2]. Natural resource extraction and other 
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land-based activities that create economic value take place in the broader political economy of 
development, characterized by shifting configurations of market and state actors that determine 
governance arrangements of resource access, control and property rights. However, resource 
access governed by political economic actors and institutions does not go unchallenged as evi-
denced by conflicts over extractive activity and land use. These resistance movements seek to 
contest patterns of resource control and access, and “to challenge the institutions, structures and 
discourses that determine the social distribution of assets, as well as their relative productivity, 
security, and reproducibility” (Bebbington et al., 2008: 2900).
Political ecology describes relations between cultural practices and resource management and 
searches for ways to integrate the biophysical, the cultural and the economic in an attempt to pro-
duce just and sustainable outcomes (Escobar, 2006; Peet and Watts, 1993). The “political” in politi-
cal ecology refers to contestations over land use and struggles by communities for social and 
ecological justice. Subaltern groups engage in a process of “conscientization” as knowing subjects 
that achieve a deepening awareness of both the socio-cultural reality which shapes their lives and 
of their capacity to transform that reality (Freire, 1970: 51). Conflicts over resources have been 
described as “cultural distribution conflicts” arising from power relations between different cul-
tural groups (Escobar, 2006: 122). For many Indigenous communities natural resources are not 
valued just in monetary terms that are reflected in commodity prices. The natural environment is 
often valued for reasons that are non-economic, for example as cultural resources where sacred 
sites are in an integral part of Indigenous cultural identity. The problem of resource distribution 
therefore needs to be conceptualized not just in economic terms but also ecologically and culturally 
given that nature and natural resources are valued in those terms as well.
If political economy is the basis for understanding economic distribution then political ecology 
becomes the basis for understanding the unequal distribution of ecological problems arising from 
dominant economic strategies of development and growth. Struggles around protection of forests, 
wetlands, lakes, and rivers are conflicts about ecological distribution. To the economic and eco-
logical dimensions of distribution Escobar (2006: 125) adds a cultural dimension that identifies the 
“distributive effects of cultural dominance” and conflicts that arise as a result. Political ecology 
reveals the incommensurability between economy and ecology (if the latter is to be recognized in 
non-economic terms). Identifying culturally diverse models of nature further deepens this incom-
mensurability because different groups assign different cultural meanings to nature. The defense of 
nature and place, which is the basis of many Indigenous resistance movements, thus becomes both 
a defense of the source of livelihood as well as a defense of cultural identity (Escobar, 2008). When 
different cultural meanings and practices conflict with each other, culture becomes political, a 
space where particular groups attempt to redefine social power by deploying alternate meanings of 
development, economy, nature, democracy and property rights (Rajagopal, 2003).
Indigenous communities across the world have maintained their distinctive cultural practices 
through subsistence economic activities like hunting, fishing, agriculture and even small-scale artisa-
nal mining. Thus, economy-culture-ecology constitutes the political ecology of livelihood struggles 
in different localities. The interaction and contestations between these three domains, reflect the 
embeddedness of communities in their political ecologies. As we will show later, mining projects can 
disembed communities from their local political ecologies because of their negative social and envi-
ronmental impacts, leading to conflicts between communities, mining corporations, and the state.
Resistance movements can lead to differing outcomes: extreme outcomes for communities 
include dispossession and ethnocide as was the case during the colonization of the Americas. 
Ethnocide—the deliberate and systematic destruction of the culture of an ethnic group—is an exis-
tential threat for several Amazonian tribes in Brazil under the current government’s proposal to 
expand oil and gas exploration on Indigenous territories where communities would be “consulted” 
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about projects but not given veto power (Londoño and Casado, 2020). In other cases communities 
have been successful in negotiating their demands with mining companies and governments lead-
ing to regulatory reform (Bebbington et al., 2008). Other possible outcomes include self-determi-
nation and increased participation in governance (Banerjee, 2000). The theoretical framework of 
our study is shown in Figure 1.
Methodology
Our empirical analysis of three resistance movements in India, Brazil, and Chile adopts a political 
ecology approach in explaining ongoing struggles against extractive projects. As such our cases con-
stitute a theoretical rather than generalizable sample. We believe that the cases are comparable and 
“controlled by the emerging theory” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 45) as can be seen by the remarkable 
similarities in the way local communities framed their resistance to mining as cultural and livelihood 
struggles. A wide variety of primary and secondary data sources were used to reconstruct the case 
studies that we discuss in the next section. Table 1 lists our primary and secondary data sources.
It is also important to point out that we are not representing communities as unified and homog-
enous entities. Rather we acknowledge that the notion of “community” is contested in terms of 
membership, inclusions and exclusions, which can lead to inequalities and marginalization within 
communities. Our intention was to understand the subjective experiences of individuals who were 
engaged in resistance. We provide a summary of the three cases below.
“Mountain is our soul”: The Niyamgiri resistance movement in 
India
The resistance movement in India was over the construction of a bauxite mine by the Vedanta 
Group in the Niyamgiri mountain range inhabited by about 8000 Dongria Kondh tribals, for whom 
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Figure 1. A framework of resource extraction and resistance.
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the mountains are not only a source of livelihood but carry deep cultural and religious signifi-
cance—the very “soul” of the tribal communities. The mountains are also a rich source of bauxite 
and a particular hill, the Niyam Dongar, was the proposed site for a bauxite mine that would supply 
ore to an existing refinery located on the plains. The initial protests were over land acquisition for 
the construction of that particular refinery (Padel and Das, 2006). Resistance against the construc-
tion of the refinery was overcome by a combination of state repression including beatings and 
imprisonment of protestors as well as payoffs and bribes made by the company including promises 
of resettlement and compensation that divided opposition to the refinery.
Although the resistance movement failed in its attempt to stop the construction of the refinery, 
local activists along with tribal communities started organizing against the construction of the pro-
posed bauxite mine to be built on the mountain. They also garnered support from nearby tribes and 
farmers who had been dispossessed during the construction of the refinery. They also documented 
problems like ground water contamination from polluting effluents and dust leading to skin dis-
eases, crop failure and livestock deaths and diseases. Opponents of the proposed open-pit mine on 
the top of the mountain claimed that the mine would have devastating ecological consequences, 
contaminate the region’s water supply and adversely affect local communities’ livelihoods and 
culture.
The struggle continued for more than 10 years with battles being fought in the courts, in the 
media, on the ground at the mine site, at the state capital Bhubaneshwar, the national capital Delhi 
and at the headquarters of the company in London. Local resistance received the support of national 
advocacy networks who used their international connections to draw the attention of powerful 
Western NGOs like Amnesty International, Survival International and Action Aid, who trans-
formed the movement into an international one.
Table 1. Data sources for the three cases.
Data sources Niyamgiri, India Paracatu, Brazil Huasco Valley, Chile
Primary Interviews with 9 activists and 
2 NGO members
Interviews with 68 
local community/NGO 
residents and 12 company 
representatives.
Interviews with 12 local 
community residents and 
three national NGO activists.
Primary Participant observation and 




interviews with local 
community residents
Participant observation and 
ethnographic interviews with 
local community residents
Secondary Email exchanges and postings 
on a daily electronic mailing 
listserv maintained by activists
Email exchanges Email exchanges and daily 
postings on Facebook page 
maintained by activists
Secondary Regional and national 
newspaper articles, press 
releases, legal documents, 
research reports, and other 
documents
Activist blogs and local 
and regional newspapers
International, Regional 
and national newspaper 
articles, press releases, legal 
documents, research reports, 
and other documents
Secondary Two documentary films: “The 
Call of Mother Earth” directed 
by Saroj Kumar Mahapatra and 
“Niyamgiri, You are Still Alive” 
produced by the Save Niyamgiri 
Committee
One documentary film 
“Ouro de Sangue” (Blood 
Gold in English) directed 
by Sandro Neiva
“El Dorado: El sed del oro” 
(“El Dorado: the thirst 
for gold” award winning 
documentary directed by 
Richard Desjardins
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The conflict was finally resolved by the Indian Supreme Court, which ruled that the mining 
project could only proceed with the consent of the tribal communities that would be impacted 
(overturning an earlier ruling that had approved the project). Twelve gram sabhas (village coun-
cils) were set up to consult with the communities involved and in August 2013 all 12 councils 
voted against the project. In January 2014, the Ministry for Environment and Forests ruled that the 
mining project would not proceed, marking a victory for the resistance movement.
“Water is worth more than gold”: Mining for gold in the Huasco 
Valley, Chile
Our second case focuses on a conflict involving the Canadian mining company Barrick Gold and 
a rural community of nearly 5000 people located in the Huasco Valley in Northern Chile. Most of 
the local population consists of Indigenous peoples known as Diaguitas. The local economy in the 
Huasco valley consists of small-scale agriculture and livestock farming. The Huasco Valley com-
munity has a strong attachment to the valley, particularly to the River Huasco originating from the 
Andes mountains, whose waters are the main source of sustenance for the farming community.
After years of prospecting during the late 1970s, Barrick Gold applied for mining licenses in 1999 
for their Pascua Lama project, which involved mining around and below glaciers, which are a vital 
source of water to local communities. During the early stages of the project community members 
claimed that Barrick did not carry out any meaningful consultations with local communities (Urkidi, 
2010). A local leader who had access to the project’s environmental impact assessment report raised 
concerns about the negative impact of the mine on the glaciers and on local water sources with OLCA, 
an environmental justice NGO based in Santiago. OLCA together with the church and local community 
leaders coordinated an educational campaign designed to raise concerns among the local community, 
using street art and film screenings about other mining conflicts in the region. Community members 
also painted murals depicting environmental destruction across the municipality with slogans like 
“water is worth more than gold” and “Pascua Lama is bread for today but hunger for tomorrow.”
In 2006 the Chilean environmental authorities authorized an expansion of the Pascua Lama project, 
which involved mining under glaciers that fed local water sources. There was considerable community 
opposition to the proposed expansion and several NGOs coordinated multiple protest marches through 
the Valley to voice their outright rejection of the project. Using social media and their transnational 
networks, OLCA, the Santiago based NGO was able to internationalize the conflict resulting in the 
involvement of Canadian anti-mining groups like StopBarrick and MiningWatch Canada in the move-
ment. These groups brought local Huasco leaders to express their concerns at Barrick’s Annual General 
Meeting in Toronto and at various university campuses in an attempt to mobilize international support. 
In response Barrick Gold mounted an aggressive CSR strategy aimed at gaining the support of local 
communities and committed to invest in health, education and cultural programs. After persistent legal 
challenges by local and national activists, environmental regulators ordered Barrick Gold to perma-
nently shutdown the Pascua Lama mine in January 2018. Barrick appealed the decision; however 
Chile’s Environmental Court upheld the decision for a definitive closure of the mine in October 2018. 
This decision was upheld in September 2020 and for the first time since the legal dispute began Barrick 
announced that it would not appeal the decision.
“A necessary evil”: Mining at Paracatu, Brazil
The city of Paracatu is located in the state of Minas Gerais in Brazil. The gold mine, a joint venture 
between Rio Tinto and Autram Mineração e Participações, was built in 1987. In 2004 Kinross Gold 
Corporation, a Canadian mining company acquired the mine, which is the largest gold producer in 
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Brazil. Before the arrival of the mine most of the local population made their living from artisanal 
gold mining and subsistence agriculture. The open cast gold mine is less than 2 km from the histori-
cal city center and also borders Quilombola communities that live in nearby Sao Domingos. The 
Quilombolas are descendants of escaped African slaves who formed settlements in the hinterland 
since the mid 1600s, creating and preserving a unique culture that reflected their African origins. 
The expansion of the mining project had several negative impacts on the community: loss of liveli-
hood, loss of water sources, structural damage to many houses resulting from detonations, increased 
toxic dust pollution in the city, health impacts from the use of arsenic and cyanide, and the forced 
relocation of some Quilombola communities.
Despite community grievances about the environmental impacts of the mine there was no strong 
collective resistance movement. During the mid 2000s a local doctor tried to mobilize the com-
munity by raising awareness about high levels of arsenic dust pollution, which he claimed was 
responsible for the high rates of cancer in the community. The doctor joined forces with a 
Quilombola activist who took legal action against the mining company’s expansion plans because 
of its negative environmental and cultural impacts on the community. However, there were divi-
sions in the community because the mine provided direct and indirect employment to a significant 
proportion of the city’s population and the mine was seen as “a necessary evil,” in the words of a 
local community leader. The Quilombola community leadership was also divided in their support 
for and against the mine.
Initial mobilization met with partial success and received some media coverage. The mining 
company countered the opposition with CSR funded community projects. In response to a protest 
march, employees of the mine took out a counter-protest street march in support of the mine. After 
a few years of trying to mobilize protests with partial success the local doctor suddenly left for 
Germany, where he continued voicing his opposition to the mine via an internet blog. Many local 
residents claimed he was offered money to cease his protests at Paracatu and also alleged that the 
company’s security contractor was engaged in surveillance of protestors. During this time the 
Quilombola activist also left Sao Domingos due to alleged death threats. The resistance movement 
fizzled out in 2010 mainly because of a lack of collective resistance and divisions in the 
community.
Data analysis
The Indian data came from a larger research project that examined transnational advocacy net-
works in anti-mining movements in the state of Odisha. The Brazilian and Chilean cases were part 
of another research project that examined community perceptions of mining in eight communities. 
Interviews were recorded and transcribed. Some interviews that were conducted in local languages 
were translated by native speakers. Detailed field notes and observations were also included in the 
data analysis.
Based on our interview and archival data we reconstructed the accounts of the three resistance 
movements. We also conducted validity checks with key informants to assess if our narratives 
matched their accounts. Any inconsistences that arose were resolved through further discussion 
and triangulation with other data sources. Initial open coding of the interviews was first done sepa-
rately for each case, resulting in a total of 47 categories. Further analysis involved combining cat-
egories into themes based on similarities and differences. For example, we were able to combine 
the initial set of categories into the following 13 themes: development, role of NGOs, mobilization, 
environmental concerns, cultural survival, state repression, political participation, resistance prac-
tices, government, community development, displacement, compensation, and corporate social 
responsibility. We then re-read the narratives in each theme and attempted to relate them 
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to theoretical perspectives from the literature on resistance movements. In particular we used an 
iterative process to infer themes from political ecology as the basis of resistance. For example, in 
arriving at the dimension of economy we analyzed our transcripts to locate all references to eco-
nomic development, economic benefits, jobs, livelihoods, money, etc. This allowed us to interpret 
them as elements of the broader theoretical dimension of economy. We then constructed narratives 
that reflected participants’ experiences of the economy. Next, we turned to the political ecology 
literature where we found references to local economies, subsistence economies, and livelihoods, 
which helped to validate our empirically developed codes. We returned to our data to find cases 
where individuals described how their local economies were adversely affected either through 
displacement or environmental degradation. We followed a similar approach in interpreting themes 
that reflected culture and ecology. Based on this iterative process we were able to distil the themes 
from our data into three broad dimensions of political ecology—economy, culture, and ecology. 
We also conducted a word count from our interview transcripts of the themes that emerged. Table 
2 summarizes the frequency of words and phrases used by our respondents to describe the resist-
ance movement. The numbers in parenthesis are the frequency of occurrence of particular words 
adjusted for sample size.
Our analytic coding process is summarized in Figure 2. We present our findings based on these 
themes.
Table 2. Word counts.
Niyamgiri, 
India
(n = 11) Huasco Valley, 
Chile
(n = 15) Paracatu, Brazil (n = 70)
Economy Livelihood 33 Jobs/employment 20 Jobs/employment/work 54
Jobs/
employment
23 Compensation 14 Money 45
Development 20 Money 8 Working conditions 30
Money 10 Development 4 Development 21
Compensation 4
Total 90 (8.18)* Total 46 (3.06) Total 150 (2.14)
Ecology Land 15 Water 45 Pollution 85
Water 10 Glaciers 22 Health 31
Dust 9 Pollution 15 Water 19
Crops 9 Land 12 Dust 7
Pollution 1
Cattle 1
Total 45 (4.09) Total 94 (6.27) Total 142 (2.03)
Culture Religion 2 Culture 19 Culture 49
Culture 2 Identity 14 Identity 41
God 1 Festivals 4 Festivals 5
Religion 3
Spiritual 3
Total 5 (0.45) Total 43 (2.87) Total 95 (1.36)
*Figures in parenthesis are adjusted by sample size. Frequency counts should be interpreted contextually—instance 
“jobs and employment” were not necessarily seen as a positive outcome in all three communities. Also, the relatively 
low occurrence of “culture” in respondents’ interviews from Niyamgiri should not be interpreted as culture being less 
important: in fact the opposite is true. Culture is deeply intertwined with relationship to the land and communities did 
not articulate their spiritual connection to the land as being separate from their economic and ecological relations.
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First order codes Second order codes Aggregate theoretical dimensions
(B=Brazil; C=Chile; I=India)
Economy
- Locals are more interested in shopping malls now (C).
-City grows but doesn’t develop (B). 
-Nearby cities without mining are more developed (B).
-Sustainable development is compatible with large-scale mining (B). 
-Absence of development (B/I).
-Extracting city’s wealth (B).
-Mining does not employ many locals (C/I).
-Mining only offers low-paid/temporary jobs (B/C/I).
-Don’t want mining jobs (I)
-Mining employs many locally (B).
-Workers scared to speak out (B).
-High employee turnover (B)
-Salaried jobs created the urban Diaguita (C).
-They should employ local youth (B/C).
-Management at mine are not local and live in gated communities (B).
-Mining pays better than farming (C).
-Status symbol of being Kinross employee (B). 
-Loss of jobs from mine closure created social problems (C).
-Agriculture employs more than mining (B/C).
-More equality before big mine when locals panned for gold (B).
-The river and/or land employ more (B/C/I).
-People were happier before (C).
-Lack of skills in community to work at mine (C).
- Payment for ecological damages (C/I).
-Health impacts, low pay and few rights for workers at mine (B).
-Kinross spies on workers outside of mine in city (B).
- Tokenistic CSR projects (B/C/I).
-We won’t accept money from company (C/I).
-Kinross makes and generates lots of money locally (B).
-Mining company’s CSR divides people (B/C/I).
-Use money to rule (B/I).
-Those interested in money are in favor of the mine (B/C/I).
-Can buy people’s silence with money (B). 
-Some locals are after money from the mine (C/I).









-Impact to water sources/glaciers (B/C/I).
-Threats to existing water scarcity (B/C/I).
-Impacts to people’s health (B/C/I).
-Impacts to houses from detonations (B).
-Centrality of water and land to territory (B/C).
-Risk to food sovereignty (B/C).
-Fragility of territory (B/C).
-Joint company-community monitoring of impacts (B/C).
Culture
-Church leaders instrumental in initial mobilization (C).
-Painting church with anti-mining artwork (C).
-Importance of religion (B/C/I).
-Companies and NGOs manipulate local culture and identity to 
their advantage (B/C/I).
-Company wants to destroy indigenous/maroon culture (B/C).
-Local identity tied to land (B/C/I).
-Desire for independence from mining (C).
-Local culture emerged out of mining (B).
-Difficult to practice indigenous/maroon culture in urban centres 
(B/C).
-Culture intertwined with water and land and livelihoods (C/I).
-Dependence on handouts from state/companies (B/C/I).
-Rise in alcohol and drug use (B/C).
-Many are losing their sense of collective identity (B/C).
-Fragmented collective identity with internal conflict over mining 
(B).
-Relocation and dispossession (I)
-Locals who collaborate with company seen as sell-outs (H).
-Festivals sponsored by companies and NGOs (B/C/I)
Threats to ecology







Figure 2. Thematic coding.
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Findings
Economy: The development battleground
Communities impacted by mining had differing perceptions of economic benefits: in Niyamgiri the 
community rejected any offers of money or employment and were strongly opposed to being reset-
tled. For them, development meant continuation of their traditional lifestyles and any economic 
returns arising from mining were not perceived as being beneficial, in fact were seen as detrimental 
to their livelihoods. As one activist at Niyamgiri mentioned:
‘They say mining can bring employment, but there is no employment. Maybe in the beginning, yes. There 
is some dirty work to do but for the actual production process, they bring in their experts’.
Forced eviction of villagers, often without appropriate compensation, during the construction of 
the refinery dispossessed villagers of their farmlands and forests, which were the source of their 
livelihoods, leaving them to become dependent on the company as either casual wage laborers or 
as recipients of handouts. Most of the high-skilled and well-paid jobs went to outsiders or “experts.” 
Within a few years of the refinery there were more non-residents of the area that had regular work 
while the displaced communities were forced to live in degrading conditions. In the words of a 
displaced villager:
‘They made the factory on our fields, on our forest. But we don’t get any jobs. There is no work and now 
we live by collecting leaves and firewood from Niyamgiri and selling it in Muniguda. Then we get money 
to buy food. Why did they build the factory here? It has brought great misery to us. We have been 
devastated. They never give our village any work. We are staying in deplorable conditions. Why do you 
outsiders get work but not us? You took our land away; even then you bring such discomfort to us’.
One of the reasons why the resistance movement against the proposed bauxite mine on the 
Niyamgiri hills was stronger (and ultimately successful) was that tribal communities in the hills 
could see the extent of social, economic, and environmental degradation that resulted from the 
construction of the refinery. There were concerns that mining would not only lead to loss of liveli-
hoods but would create a new dependency on the mining company for survival of local communi-
ties. As a tribal member stated: “We are dependent on the mountains. Our lives are with Niyamgiri, 
our lifestyle is because of Niyamgiri.”
Dependency was also a key theme in the mining conflict involving Brazil’s largest gold mine in 
Paracatu, but in this case dependence was on mining not on the land. Agriculture and small-scale 
artisanal mining were the main economic activities in the region before commercial mining opera-
tions began. Plans to expand mining operations and construct a tailings dam after the company was 
granted a permit in 2011 were met with some resistance. Community grievances against the mining 
project focused on resettlement and compensation claims as well as health and environmental dam-
age from the mines. However, opposition to the mine was not particularly strong: those that bene-
fited directly or indirectly in terms of jobs did not publicly oppose the company’s expansion plans, 
while those who would be impacted negatively attempted to mobilize resistance. As a local coun-
cilor stated “Yes we are dependent on the mine, but the mine created that dependency which was 
not necessary.” A member of a local NGO engaged in mobilizing local people against the compa-
ny’s expansion plans also commented on the limited employment opportunities that mining opera-
tions would bring compared to their environmental and social costs: “Most of the workers are from 
outside and not the city. The workers from here do the basic simple manual work.” A trade union 
official also agreed with these sentiments:
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‘The company just leaves crumbs in the community. They paint a church; they put their name here and 
there. But they are taking our wealth. The best jobs are not for people from here, they come from outside. 
There are several cities around without mining but have better development rates than Paracatu. The mine 
hasn’t contributed significantly to the city. Comparing what they take from here and what they leave is 
very unequal’.
In Chile there were more divisions about the expected economic benefits of the mine. About 
half the community were interested in mining jobs instead of grape farming which was their pri-
mary economic activity. The development discourse was dominant in all three cases but the mean-
ing of development was contested: for state and market actors development meant expanding the 
mining sector, building the required infrastructure to provide employment and generating tax rev-
enues and royalties. However, most communities were skeptical about how development would 
benefit them as an activist involved in the Niyamgiri resistance movement commented:
‘Development has become a religion now, the most fanatic religion. And you see the kind of economic 
model that is being forced into India by the government. And we see what kind of devastation this causes. 
So we don’t accept it. We are not against development but it shouldn’t lead people into a more deprived 
state and shouldn’t be imposed but rather demand driven. If there is large damage to local economies and 
ecologies through mining then it should not be considered a good form of development. The needs of the 
tribals are not being catered to by this form of development and there is no demand or permission by the 
tribes for mining. The State is basically pushing a model of development that is actually 
anti-development’.
Critics of the development state have also pointed to the neocolonial conditions that are embed-
ded in resource extraction. Colonial modes of resource extraction continued in postcolonial coun-
tries in the name of “development” with rural and Indigenous communities facing the brunt of 
development policies (Escobar, 2006). There was an acute awareness of neocolonial domination in 
all three resistance movements. As an activist in Niyamgiri stated:
‘What is the political economy in our country? There are different political parties and even up to the 
highest parties, they believe that India is a semi-feudal, semi-colonial state. And now I think it has become 
a fully neocolonial state as far as the tribals are concerned’.
A tribal member from the Niyamgiri hills stated:
‘They want to displace us to some barren land. What can they give us in return? Niyamgiri is not a pile of 
money. That mountain is our life. We are the children of Niyamgiri. It seems like some colonial ghost has 
returned. I have this axe ready for them’.
On the other side of the world, the same sentiment was echoed by the president of a trade union 
in Paracatu, Brazil:
‘I always say since 300 years we produce gold and the slave would come put it on a donkey send to Rio de 
Janeiro and then to Portugal. Today the slaves take the gold, put it on a helicopter and send to Canada. 
Paracatu continues to remain poor, the city has never benefited from this gold extraction’.
What mode of development becomes dominant in a particular political economy is an outcome 
of power relations between different actors. However, as our cases illustrate even the relatively 
powerless engage in modes of resistance that reflect their livelihood struggles against markets and 
Banerjee et al. 15
states. For Indigenous communities culture and ecology also become weapons in these struggles, 
as we will show in the next section.
Culture: The ideological battleground
Resistance as cultural survival is also framed by folklore and cultural beliefs (Ali and Behrendt, 
2001). Cultural practices, religious ceremonies, songs, and dances are fundamental to Indigenous 
identity that reflects their relationship with the land and are an integral part of the political ecology 
of resistance movements. In Niyamgiri, the resistance movement was framed as a matter of cul-
tural survival. Thus, for the Kondh tribes the “value” of the mountain is not extrinsic: Niyamgiri is 
their “soul,” the “abode of their gods,” which is a worldview that is profoundly incommensurable 
with the economic value of the bauxite in the mountain. A tribal member from Niyamgiri described 
the struggle against the mining company, drawing from their cultural history of the region:
‘And there was a giant who was eating people, killing people. So Gajare, what did he do? He killed the 
giant. So, the time has come now, Vedanta, that is the giant. So it has come to destroy Dongria Kondh life. 
Dongria Kondh people, like Gajare should be very strong and they have fight against the giant Vedanta’.
In the Huasco Valley, Chile an Indigenous leader from the Diaguita community also identified 
cultural survival as being integral to the resistance movement against mining companies:
‘We were the first People the Spanish encountered upon entering Chile from Peru, and the Spaniards killed 
our Cacique (chief) in front of his family, yet we continued fighting even as the slaves of the Spanish. . . .we 
burned down La Serena (a town located 400km south of Huasco) twice, when it belonged to the Spanish. . . 
So we kept the Valley for our people and they the Spanish stayed near the coast. . . . . . .so if we allow all 
these proposed mega mines into our valley it will turn into a mining valley and our culture will die. We want 
the mining companies to leave so we can keep our identity, culture and water which is life’.
In Paracatu, Brazil there were conflicts between the Quilombola people and the mining com-
pany over resettlement and compensation claims. The expansion of the Kinross mine in the region 
came at the expense of the destruction of two existing Quilombola communities who were forced 
to relocate to peripheral regions without any compensation. One Quilombola member who was 
evicted from her land had this to say:
‘The company doesn’t help us at all. They might be helping urban communities. The quilombos are the 
real neighbors here and have history, all our ancestors lived there. It is difficult to maintain our culture 
now. We can’t even go back to our quilombo lands to practice anything so the culture’s dying. I used to be 
on the jury of our dances. The company put security guards there so we can’t get past them, besides 
they’ve destroyed our houses. Its hard to live this culture in an urban area’.
Interestingly, culture was also deployed by both NGOs in their resistance to mining operations 
as well as mining companies in their counter-mobilization strategies. In the Niyamgiri case, the 
international NGO Action Aid was accused by local activists of misrepresenting tribal culture to 
western audiences in order to promote their own agenda while ignoring the network of local activ-
ists and organizations engaged in larger struggles about development and resource access. As part 
of their strategy to publicize the resistance movement and “showcase Dongria culture,” Action Aid 
staged a “mass worship” movement in the mountains, which the community claimed did not reflect 
local cultural practices. The NGO was also criticized for inaccurately portraying members of other 
tribal groups that were not part of the resistance movement as tribal leaders just because they filled 
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the “tribal slot” that appealed to western audiences (Kraemer et al., 2013). While deploying cul-
tural traditions and sacred sites may be an effective political strategy to challenge mining industries 
it can also become a double-edged sword. For instance, in the Huasco Valley, Chile it was the min-
ing company that was accused of misrepresenting and manipulating tribal culture to promote their 
CSR agenda. The company offered courses in pottery and handicrafts in an attempt to “preserve 
and promote local culture,” which local activists claimed depoliticized conflicts over resources. 
According to a local community leader:
‘None of us were interested in their “little demeaning courses and workshops.” What can they teach us 
about being Diaguitas?! We are Diaguitas and land and water are essential to us, not these courses about 
artisanal goods and pottery! Just the most vulnerable, humble people and agreed to take part but none of 
us did. We showed them we don’t want or need them in our valley!’
Another activist who was a representative of the Parish Church stated:
‘Barrick in their Diaguita publications speak about ceramics and knitting. They financed the Indigenous 
New Year of the sun. They are manipulating their (Diaguita) identity for their own good. Barrick does it to 
divert the attention to the secondary elements of the identity and not to teach the parts of territory and water 
and language, which are the primary ones’.
In addition to tensions and contradictions around economy and culture, ecology also emerged 
as a key theme of resistance in the three regions.
Ecology: The environmental battleground
Another driving force of all three resistance movements in the study was concerns about the envi-
ronmental impacts of mining. These concerns were heightened among Indigenous communities, 
who have a fundamentally different relationship with the land than urban or semi-urban communi-
ties. Economic, ecological, and cultural domains are inextricably linked in Indigenous communi-
ties and hence any environmental threat to their lands, waters, or animals becomes a threat to their 
livelihoods and health, their identity and way of life. In Niyamgiri, environmental impacts of the 
refinery became apparent both during construction and operation of the refinery. The villagers 
blamed pollution from the refinery for increasing rates of skin diseases, livestock diseases, crop 
damage, and groundwater contamination due to seepage of toxic slurry. There were also concerns 
that if the bauxite mine was constructed on the mountains the influx of workers and machinery 
would pose threats to wildlife and forest cover.
One local described how pollution from the refinery was affecting their lives:
‘See there is dust everywhere. Niyamgiri is covered with dust. The trees are not bearing fruits. Crops are 
failing. The dust has covered all our rice crops. When we taste the rice it is bitter. Then the water is polluted 
because of the dust from the factory. The water in the wells is also polluted. All the dust and emissions 
affect our village. Everyone is sick and we have to take care of all our medical requirements. Don’t ever 
touch the red mud. Your skin might peel off. We have to protest against this’.
At Paracatu, Brazil, community members complained of dangerous air and noise pollution as 
well as water contamination. As one resident commented:
‘The main concern in health is with arsenic from the dust. One worker had 6 times the national limit of 
arsenic in his blood. After 8 months away from arsenic he still has high limits. A lot of people at Paracatu 
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have cancer, cancer of the cervix, breast, prostate. The company don’t listen to the population on issues of 
pollution. A university found proof of it in the air but the company say it’s an isolated incident. The 
company don’t give us answers. The water here is polluted, the company then shows its research as proof 
to show it’s not polluted’.
At Huasco Valley, Chile, threats to water supply, loss of biodiversity and soil contamination, 
and were the key environmental concerns of surrounding communities. As a Diaguita farmer 
stated: “The Diaguitas, most of us are micro farmers. We are defending our farms. Our trees are 
drying out.”
To summarize our findings: market and state actors strongly supported the mining projects in all 
three countries. Community resistance arose because of the detrimental social, economic, cultural, 
and environmental impacts of mining. Communities engaged in a variety of resistance practices 
including direct actions and blockades, protest marches, lawsuits, public campaigns, mobilizing 
national and international NGOs, lobbying governments, and challenging environmental impact 
assessments. Conflicts revolved around differential impacts on economy, ecology and culture. 
Contestations about economy were about the lack of real jobs, dependence on mining, imposed 
modes of development, inadequate compensation, inequitable distribution of mining incomes, and 
loss of livelihoods. Ecological concerns included loss of landscape, deforestation, water and air 
pollution, waste overflow, health hazards to humans, and cattle and crop failure. Contestations 
around culture included threats to cultural traditions and practices, desecration of sacred sites, lack 
of access to cultural sites and appropriation of Indigenous culture by market, state and civil society 
actors. Counter mobilization strategies of market and state actors included criminalization of dis-
sent, corporate-state collusion, arrests and physical assaults on protestors, refusal to hear griev-
ances, forced consent processes, repressive legislation, payoffs and bribes, divide and rule 
strategies, and CSR practices.
Returning to the research questions that motivated this study, we found that local political ecol-
ogies that reflected communities’ relationships to the land were incompatible with the global politi-
cal economy of resource extraction, leading to conflicts. Our findings highlight key elements of 
resistance as identified by Mumby (2005: 23): collective and organized efforts by communities 
engaging in practices of resistance (“form of praxis”) against state and market actors (“established 
social patterns and structures”), deploying cultural and social identities to disrupt and interrogate 
dominant “identity logics.” The “mechanisms of control” that regulate and manage resistance 
movements involve political economic structures dominated by state and market interests. The 
outcomes of the resistance movements were different: in India and Chile the resistance movement 
was successful in stopping the mine but not so in the case of Brazil. Given the qualitative nature of 
the case studies we do not want to generalize our findings to other conflicts. And as mentioned 
earlier failure of resistance does not mean failure to resist—there were remarkable similarities in 
how communities mobilized local political ecologies of resistance despite the differences between 
the three countries. While the themes of economy, ecology and culture reflected political ecologies 
of all three communities there were also differences in the extent of their embeddedness. In the 
next section we will discuss the theoretical implications of our findings by examining these differ-
ences and how they may have influenced the strength and outcomes of the resistance movements.
Discussion and implications
Based on our findings we theorize that disembeddedness was at the root of the conflicts, which 
explained why and how the three communities opposed mining projects. Economic rationality in 
market societies is always embedded in social relationships to some degree, despite an economic 
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logic that separates economics from society and culture (Granovetter, 1985). Embeddedness was 
more prevalent in pre-market societies where the separation of economic and social spheres was 
less discrete (Polanyi, 1944/2001). The economy in local political ecologies is based on the rela-
tionship between land and livelihood. Mining changes this relationship and the alternative liveli-
hoods of wage labor in low end jobs that mining projects offer, while providing an income, cannot 
compensate for the loss of a livelihood that is derived from the land, especially for communities 
whose lives and identities are intimately connected with the land. Disembeddedness from the land 
is also reflected in the increasing separation of ecological, economic and cultural spheres that con-
stitute local political ecologies. It is this disembeddedness that is being resisted by communities 
impacted by mining activity.
Disembeddedness arising from threats to economy, ecology and culture was not uniformly dis-
tributed across the three regions. The Indigenous community at Niyamgiri was the most “tradi-
tional” in the sense that their economic, social, and cultural lives were inseparable and inextricably 
linked to the mountains—this “ecological embeddedness” defined their identity which was inti-
mately linked to the land (Whiteman and Cooper, 2000). Constructing a bauxite mine on their 
sacred mountain did not just pose an environmental problem but was a threat to their livelihoods, 
their lives and their identity. Defending their land was also a defence of their cultural identity and 
way of life and this political ecology of resistance was incommensurable with the political econ-
omy of extraction because of the different meanings and value attached to nature and the land.
Communities in Niyamgiri and Paracatu were at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of eco-
nomic disembeddedness: in Niyamgiri the communities derived their livelihoods from the land, 
had no interest in whatever economic benefits the mine would bring and vigorously opposed any 
resettlement plans. The economic life of the community in Paracatu on the other hand was closely 
tied to the mining project and residents saw few lucrative opportunities in other sectors. There was 
a history of small-scale artisan mining in the region but once that economic activity ceased (because 
it was deemed “illegal”) the community became more dependent on the company for direct and 
indirect employment. At Huasco Valley the community was almost equally divided between those 
that were interested in jobs and money that the mine would bring and those who felt their liveli-
hoods as grape farmers would be threatened because of water shortage and contamination.
Cultural disembeddedness also differed across the communities. The Niyamgiri community had 
a strong spiritual connection with the land and were united in their opposition to proposed mine, 
which was to be built on one of their sacred sites. Paracatu was already a mining town and the 
expansion would not have a significant effect on the culture of the Quilombolas. In Huasca Valley 
the situation was more complex: while mining had little impact on the community’s cultural prac-
tices there was a resurgence in the importance of Diaguita identity. Both opposing factions lever-
aged culture to make their respective case: for example, international NGOs showcased the culture 
of Niyamgiri’s Indigenous tribes in their campaigns claiming that mining would endanger cultural 
traditions of the tribes. At Huasco Valley the mining company promoted and funded a number of 
cultural events and even commissioned a book called “Diaguita” to demonstrate their respect for 
local culture. However, corporate CSR strategies that leveraged Indigenous cultural identity were 
decoupled from community concerns over damage to land and water, which were also integral to 
cultural identity.
In terms of ecology while all three mining projects had negative environmental effects percep-
tions of threats and strength of opposition to the mine varied. At Niyamgiri the community was 
united in its efforts to stop the mine because they had witnessed firsthand the severe environmental 
problems that resulted from the construction of the refinery on the plains leading to resettlement of 
neighboring communities. At Huasco Valley responses to ecological concerns were divided 
between those that sought higher compensation and demanded better environmental management 
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practices from the company and those that were firmly opposed to the mine. At Paracatu, the com-
munity documented the deleterious health effects from environmental pollution but wanted the 
company and government to address their health concerns rather than oppose the mining project.
Our findings reveal how interconnections between ecology, economy and culture and the extent 
of disembeddedness arising from mining can influence the direction and strength of the resistance 
movements. At Niyamgiri there was no separation of economy, ecology, or culture given the com-
munity’s spiritual connection to the lands. Health and wellbeing of the community was seen as 
being inseparable from ecological, cultural, and economic relations to the land. As a result their 
opposition was united and strong. At Huasco Valley there were clearer separations between culture 
and economy/ecology where tradeoffs between economic benefits and ecological problems were 
to be negotiated through higher compensation from the company. Ecological concerns prevailed in 
the decision by the Chilean government to halt mining expansion. At Paracatu economic depend-
ence on the mine was sufficiently high to prevail over cultural and ecological concerns, which the 
communities wanted to be addressed separately, thus weakening the anti-mining resistance move-
ment .
Our findings make two contributions to the resistance literature. First, we have explained the 
basis of translocal resistance by bridging insights from subaltern studies and political ecology to 
explain how forms of struggles emerge. Second, our empirical analysis provides a “power from 
below” account of translocal subaltern resistance in three countries rather than describe processes 
of resource mobilization, which tends to be the predominant approach of describing social move-
ments (de Bakker et al., 2013). We expand on these contributions below.
Our findings indicate that rightful resistance (negotiation with local and state officials) and 
lawfare (using judicial systems as sites of contestation and negotiation) were the primary modes of 
subaltern resistance in the three cases. The tribal communities resisting the mining project in India 
could conceivably constitute a political society where they find themselves in conflict with the 
state in an attempt to negotiate collective rights as opposed to citizenship rights in liberal-demo-
cratic nation state. There are also overlaps and tensions between the different modes of resistance. 
For instance, in the Indian case when negotiations with the state broke down (rightful resistance), 
communities engaged in direct action by blockading roads, preventing company bulldozers from 
clearing the land and confronting state police. Legal action to prevent the mine continued, as did 
the mobilization of external groups both domestic and international. Through lawfare and direct 
action the community was able to obtain a decision from the Indian Supreme Court that overturned 
prior approval of the mine. However, there are limits to what the law can provide for subaltern 
communities and laws are always subject to change. For instance, partly in response to the success-
ful resistance mounted by the Dongria Kandh, the Indian government introduced new legislation 
in 2015 to fast track development projects while amending existing forest rights legislation so that 
new projects are not required to seek the approval of tribal village councils (Barry and Bagri, 
2014).
Our findings indicate that subaltern resistance is more a reformist project where subaltern popu-
lations engage with hegemonic structures of subordination. In our study we found resistance as 
negotiation (rather than resistance as negation) to be the defining feature of subaltern resistance, 
where the modern state remains at the heart of subaltern politics (Chandra, 2015: 564). Communities 
resisting extractive projects in Brazil, Chile, and India not only endure domination but also attempt 
to negotiate better outcomes with existing power structures by deploying key aspects of their polit-
ical ecology: economy, ecology, and culture.
The state is a key player in resistance movements both in its developmental role of providing 
employment, alleviating poverty and generating economic growth as well as in its protective role 
in providing security for its citizens. The state also claims a monopoly of the “legitimate” use of 
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violence and physical force where the army and police can be used to suppress dissent (Özen and 
Özen, 2009). The role of the state thus appears to be somewhat contradictory when it comes to 
governing extractive industries, where on the one hand the state is responsible for economic devel-
opment and jobs, which mining can provide; and on the other hand it has a responsibility to protect 
its citizens who are displaced, dispossessed or suffer ill-health as a result of mining operations. In 
many cases the state is also a joint-venture partner with mining corporations, which raises serious 
conflicts of interest about the state’s commitment to the welfare of communities negatively 
impacted by mining. Regardless of whether the state plays a coercive or “meta-regulatory catalytic 
role” (Reinecke and Ansari, 2016: 320) public/private governance mechanisms can do little to 
address the needs of subaltern populations (Maher et al., 2019).
If, as our findings indicate, subaltern groups are attempting to rework power relations and alter 
the conditions of their subordination through their political ecology then the political task of resist-
ance movements is to foster a “democratic equalizing movement” of economic, ecological, and 
cultural distribution (Escobar, 2006: 133). It is this political ecology that can repoliticize the local 
sphere and counter neoliberal practices in the larger political economy. Such a political ecology 
needs an acknowledgement of collective property rights where collectivity is not posed in unitary 
opposition to neoliberal notions of individualism but rather as something that could coexist within 
dominant individual property rights regimes, but still challenge the power of an economic system 
that produces social arrangements based on private property rights. Resistance movements against 
resource extraction provide a different understanding of property and rights that are focused on 
relationships and custodianship with land rather than ownership (Rajagopal, 2003). Autonomy and 
self-determination of local communities cannot be reached without a clear understanding of how 
Indigenous collective property rights can be articulated at international, national and local levels of 
decision making for extractive projects and how the right to say no to development can be given 
regulatory authority. The political space of Indigenous postcoloniality cannot be recognized within 
the postcolonial nation state framework. The translocality of resistance movements can create a 
new political space that while not directly challenging the authority and sovereignty of nation 
states may allow some form of Indigenous sovereignty to coexist that can enable a plurality of local 
voices to have a say in decision-making. Conflicts over mining are not just material conflicts but 
also epistemic conflicts—a form of epistemic violence that uses language and legal mechanisms of 
dominant powers to marginalize certain populations (Spivak, 1988). We believe listening to these 
voices may enable us to understand alternate realities and point to the possibilities of coexistence 
of apparently incommensurable worldviews.
Conclusions and future directions
What then can these three anti-mining resistance movements tell us about the future of resistance? 
Our study has implications for emerging research on the organization of resistance movements that 
go beyond describing social relations and mobilization strategies but are more place and territory 
based struggles (Ehrnström-Fuentes, 2020). Our theory of the political ecology of resistance move-
ments situates conflicts in the disembeddedness of economic, ecological, and cultural practices and 
the broader market/state forces that constitute the political economy. Resistance movements are 
thus an ongoing process of negotiations between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces involv-
ing contested relations of power and knowledge and cultural contestations over the construction of 
a collective identity (Munro, 2014). More research is needed to understand the conditions under 
which the deployment of cultural difference as identity can engender participation in resistance 
movements and not just serve as symbolic challenges to dominant cultural codes but how cultural 
forms of mobilization can lead to institutional change.
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Second, dependence on extractive industries also defines livelihood struggles. Our analysis 
indicates that a community’s dependence on mining and the extent of a community’s social, cul-
tural, and economic alignment with the industry influences the strength of resistance movements. 
Opposition to mining was stronger and conflicts more intense in areas that had relatively lower 
levels of dependence on mining. Among communities that historically depended on mining for 
their livelihoods, the level and intensity of conflicts were lower, despite grievances against social 
dislocation and environmental damage that flared up occasionally. Dependence on mining also 
influenced the capacity of communities to mobilize resistance. More research is needed to examine 
the relationships between mining dependency and community capacities to articulate alternate 
forms of development that do not rely on extraction.
Third, our findings have implications for organization studies, in particular the need for a more 
nuanced and critical understanding of organization-stakeholder relationships (Banerjee, 2000; 
Maher, 2019; Yakovleva and Vazquez-Brust, 2012). More empirical research is needed to examine 
the consequences of corporate stakeholder engagement strategies for local communities. In stake-
holder theory corporate managers have the authority to determine power, legitimacy, and urgency 
of stakeholders, which effectively marginalizes some stakeholders. Studies that focus on the out-
comes of stakeholder engagement strategies for marginalized communities will yield valuable 
insights into the tensions and contradictions that arise in the implementation of CSR. The effective-
ness of many social responsibility and stakeholder engagement standards in the extractive indus-
tries remains in doubt given that virtually all the corporations involved in the 3000-plus ongoing 
conflicts in the extractive industries are signatories to these standards. A fruitful area for future 
research is to examine how standards dealing with mining impacts are operationalized and under-
stand how consultative processes and “meaningful participation of Indigenous communities in 
decision making” actually works on the ground.
Finally, our analysis provides a foundation for a normative theory of the governance of natural 
resource extraction. Conflicts can also generate positive consequences in terms of changed institu-
tional arrangements that enable more direct participation of affected communities and there is a 
need to understand the conditions and mechanisms where conflicts can lead to institutional innova-
tion (Bebbington et al., 2008). For example, Indigenous communities are using their own organi-
zational forms like gram sabhas in India or los caracoloes by the Zapatistas in Mexico to negotiate 
with extractive corporations and governments. These new forms of local authority may provide 
some means of self-determination whereby tribal councils can decide on development projects on 
their lands. All resistance movements in the extractives industries are not anti-mining per se and 
some conflicts are over more equitable distribution of rents and provision of employment and edu-
cation. More research is needed on the types of institutional arrangements that can generate equi-
table outcomes from extractive projects while minimizing its environmental impacts as well as 
providing the necessary authority that can prevent mining projects from proceeding, based on the 
desires and needs of affected communities.
Demands for autonomy from different cultural groups can be seen as demands for coexistence 
and marks a departure from discourses of inclusion and multiculturalism, which, once interpellated 
with neoliberal notions of homo oeconomicus imposes “on all societies a structure of power in 
which the cultural codes of modernity have been inscribed” (Escobar, 2006: 128). Livelihood 
struggles of Indigenous communities are more about demands for “pluri-culturalism” than multi-
culturalism where the former is predicated on economy, ecology, and culture and collective rights 
along with a reflexive appreciation that collectivity is always contested along gender, class and 
ethnic identities. Understanding the diversity of resistance movements will enable us to identify 
the range of generative practices and forms of organizing that do not focus solely on “inclusion” 
and “engagement” but also build collective capabilities that can foster coexistence.
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